Russia and Ukraine

 

Short answer - it's complicated. Long answer as follows:

Why is Russia acting now?

1) Russia sees the rest of Europe as weak, unwilling or unable to do much more  (they may just be realising that they may have miscalculated on this, hence the nuclear Putin raising the nuclear threat). While the covid pandemic has had a major impact on Russia, it has been keen to play this down while by contrast the very public debates, protests, riots and chaos in many west European countries have been seen as signs of the unravelling of Western democracy, showing up the flaws of the democratic system and its lack of strong leadership in times of crisis. 

2) The UK is engaged in domestic navel gazing and the shenanigans of Boris Johnson, France is focused on elections, much of the Europe is in covid induced disarray, Belarus (with Russian support) has cynically shown how effective using immigrants is as a pressure tactic against the EU, but more than anything the European energy crisis means that Russia feels it has much of the continent beholden to the drug of Russian gas. Nearly half of the gas used in the EU comes from Russia. Germany is particularly dependent on it. Putin has used this to put pressure on the EU not to intervene.

It's interesting that the UK has sent some (very limited) military aid to Ukraine, defensive weapons such as anti-tank missiles. Britain gets most of its gas from the North Sea, either from British fields or Norway, with hardly any coming from Russia, perhaps giving Britain (which of course has also left the EU) more leeway to support Ukraine, though drastic defence cuts mean that the British military is hardly in a position to defend the British Isles from possible Russian threats (Russia has been making regular incursions in to northern British airspace and territorial waters for years now) much less send significant support to Ukraine. The UK has stationed soldiers and tanks in Estonia now to make the point that aggression against fellow NATO members will not be tolerated. 

3) Ukraine has actually become stronger in recent years, rebuilding its military with an eye on the increased Russian threat, and using the simmering "low intensity" conflict with Russian forces in the rebel provinces to better train its army to counter Russian forces. The Ukrainian economy too is not the basket case it once was. Israel and Ukraine have developed close economic ties and thousands of Ukrainians in Ukraine are employed by Israeli companies. As Putin is now finding out, invading and conquering Ukraine is not the cake walk he expected it to be. Putin is now calling in military back-up from his allies in Belarus. 

4) Global supply chains problems and soaring commodity prices have piqued Russia's interest in gaining control over Ukraine's rich resources, including coal, uranium, iron/steel and titanium. Ukraine has long been known as Europe's "bread basket", famed for its fertile soil and strong agricultural sector. It is a major producer of wheat, sunflowers (including sunflower oil production), potatoes, corn and honey. 

5) One can also speculate that the chaotic Allied withdrawal from Afghanistan may have emboldened Putin to make his move, especially when combined with the covid induced chaos, political polarisation and BLM protest movement. From Putin's perspective the US, like the European democracies, looks to be faltering, unsure of itself and too pre-occupied with domestic troubles to pay much attention to events in Ukraine and Russia. 

What is Russia's beef with Ukraine and how has it affected Russian policy vis a vis Ukraine?

1) Just as Erdogan in Turkey is trying to recreate the old Ottoman sphere of influence in an attempt to restore Turkish hegemony to the region, if not an actual empire, so it seems Putin is even more aggressively pursuing a similar policy, reverting to classic paradigms of imperial Russia. Putin has been quite clear about restoring Russian control of some sort over its traditional areas of influence in as much of its former empire as possible. 

2) There is a pattern here of Russian policy with many of its neighbours. It goes back to a defense doctrine of Tsarist Russia, adopted also by the Soviet Union and by Putin, a desire for large buffer territories between Russia and the western powers. Russia is concerned about its security and defense interests, worried that the westward expansion of NATO and the EU are a threat. Maintaining close ties with the regime in Belarus (some would say Belarus is a vassal state to Russia) is an important plank of this policy, as is keeping Ukraine closely tied to Russia. According to this Ukraine turning to the West, let alone actually talking of joining the EU or even NATO, a defense alliance which came in to being as a bulwark against Soviet Russia, cannot be tolerated as it directly threatens Russian security. 

3) Some within Russia see the whole matter as an internal affairs between Russo-Slavic states rather than one for international diplomacy. This is part of the problem with the West exerting pressure on Russia to desist and Ukraine apparently "betraying" Russia by seeking alliances elsewhere. 

4) Ukraine with its large Russian speaking population, as well as Kiyv, the symbol of the historic Kiyevan Rus, the cradle of eastern Slavic nationhood and civilisation, is a key component in Putin's ambition, an emotive rallying point for many Russian nationalists and pan-Slavic nationalists. The Kiyevan Rus is in some ways the east Slavic "Jerusalem", the keystone of the civilisation, the place where disparate Slavic and related tribes coalesced in to a nation, adopted Orthodox Christianity from Byzantine missionaries and created a golden age centred on Kiyv, who's modern golden domed historic churches date back to its heyday in the 9th-11th centuries.

Ukraine, Russia and Belarus all trace their national origins to this point and to the city which is today the Ukrainian capital. To some in Russia it is inconceivable that such a cultural icon should be in the hands of Ukraine and not Russia, especially a staunchly independent western oriented Ukraine rather than one tightly bound by a Russian leash. 

5) Ukraine has in the 21st century doggedly tried to reorientate itself vis a vis Russia. The Orange Revolution in 2004, the ousting of the scandal ridden and pro-Russian Leonid Kuchma marked a new assertion of Ukrainian independence not just in terms of sovereignty but also orientation, a shift towards Europe and the West rather than tightly bound to Russia as it had been until then. 

6) Russia has continued to arm and support Russian backed separatists in eastern Ukraine, perpetuating a bloody proxy conflict. This is similar to the tactic Russia used with Georgia, supporting South Ossetia and Abkhazia seperatists to weaken Georgia and break of chunks of another independent, sovereign neighbouring country, in order to bring them back under Russian control.

Likewise in Moldova, where since 1992 Russia has soldiers in Transnistria, a province it encouraged to breakaway from Moldova to try to preserve more territory under Russian control. Moldova still objects to this Russian military presence decades later, and even has a clause in its constitution professing Moldovan neutrality and prohibiting the stationing of foreign soldiers on Moldovan soil. Russia can hardly accuse Moldova of attempting to join NATO or threatening Russian interests, and yet Moldova fears that they are next on the list after Ukraine.  

5) Ukraine's boundaries have always been somewhat fluid and eastern regions have always had a heavily Russian influence, while prior to the Second World War there had been substantial Polish and German minorities in regions considered to be the Ukrainian cultural, patriotic and linguistic heartland in the west of the country in the Carpathian Mountains and cities such as Lviv, Ivano-Frankivisk and Tarnopil. 

Crimea for example had traditionally been a Tatar Khanate allied with the Ottoman Empire, then later part of the Russian Empire and part of Russia. It was Nikita Krushchev in 1954 who chose to transfer Crimea to the Soviet Republic of Ukraine. His motivations for doing so are not clear to this day, whether it was because as his daughter later claimed, the Russian Krushchev was nevertheless very fond of Ukraine, his "favourite republic" or because he was concerned to ensure the Slavic identity of this strategic peninsular, who's Muslim Tartar population had largely either fled during the Russian-Turkish conflicts of the 19th century or been forcibly exiled to eastern Russia in 1944 or because gifting Crimea to Ukraine was seen as a way of more tightly binding Ukraine to Russia. Whatever the reason Putin considers it legitimate to transfer Crimea back to Russian control by force. 

Why should the Western powers care? 

1) In the 1990s, following Ukraine's declaration of independence the new Ukrainian state was in a position to become one of the world's strongest nuclear powers with the third biggest arsenal in the world. However it signed the NPT and under the conditions of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum agreed to relinquish its nuclear weapons (handing them over to Russia) in exchange for security guarantees from the US, UK and Russia. China and France pledged to respect and protect Ukraine's sovereignty and  territorial integrity. 

2) Russia's actions over the last decade are in clear breach of the Budapest Memorandum and the guarantees to protect Ukraine from any and all acts of aggression following its fulfillment of the agreement to dispose of its nuclear arsenal. Under the conditions of the agreement the US, UK must protect Ukraine from acts of aggression, as guarantors of the Budapest Memorandum the US and UK should have prevented the Russian invasion. Their failure to do so breaches their treaty obligations.

3) Russia remains in possession of a huge nuclear arsenal. With Russia becoming increasingly belligerent over the last year, members of the Ukrainian government, as well as President Zelensky are on record as saying they are seriously considering rebuilding Ukraine's nuclear capabilities in response to the Russian threat. As far as I know Ukraine has not acted on this proposal, but clearly the US and European powers are concerned about the possibility of a new nuclear arms race in Europe and the FSU states. 

4)  Russia's actions and the potential for sparking more instability and conflagrations around Russia's European borders are of great concern to many Western countries and the US. Putin in the last few years has greatly stepped up his meddling in neighbouring countries with what seems to be a view to gradually restoring the Russian empire, consider his support for pro-Russian separatists in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, going so far as to invade and go to war with Georgia in 2008. Likewise Russia's recognition and support of the breakaway Donetsk and Luhansk provinces in eastern Ukraine, as well as Russian military intervention in Negorno-Karabakh (and selling weapons to both Armenia and Azerbaijan) and more recently in Kazakhstan (propping up the current regime), plus Russia's close ties and current military "exercise" with Belarus, Europe's last dictatorship, which (some allege under Russian direction) has been attempting to pressure and destabilise the EU by creating a Middle Eastern migrant crisis on its border. 

5) The small Baltic states are watching especially closely, fearful that Russia will use a similar excuse to that used for its intervention in eastern Ukraine "protecting persecuted Russian minorities" to try to reassert Russian influence and even direct rule in Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. They however have a defence that Ukraine lacks: membership of the EU and NATO, which they hope will guarantee their security. They are concerned though that if the EU and NATO do not put up a robust response to Russia's assault on democratic Ukraine then the NATO/EU deterrence factor may wane enough that Putin will emerge emboldened from his Ukraine adventure to pursue his territorial ambitions in the Baltics.

6) Attacking an EU or NATO member would be a huge leap from going after Ukraine, but Putin is constantly pushing the boundaries and the more he sees NATO and the EU just talking the talk but not really doing much the more he will be emboldened to push further. For years now Russia has been pushing in to NATO territory, their military aircraft routinely making incursions in to NATO air space as far west as Scotland, their submarines and warships likewise literally testing the waters, testing NATO responses, stretching the limits of what NATO countries will tolerate, accept as routine and turn a blind eye to.

The defense establishments in many European countries have been worrying what this might be a prelude to, a gradual erosion of deterrence, an attempt to lull NATO defences in to accepting these incursions as routine so they don't pick up on something more dangerous. 

7) Ukraine was seen as easy pickings by Putin because it isn't EU or NATO. So maybe he'll bite off this chunk of the former Russian empire and be satisfied, Kiyv has a lot more emotional pull for Russian nationalists than many other regions of the old empire, that's certainly true. Other non-NATO/non-EU states though are looking on anxiously. Top of the list, Moldova is certainly concerned that if Ukraine falls to Russia they may be next. Georgia has already been by Russia in the last few years, they too fear that Russia will make another attempt emboldened by NATO weakness. 

There is grave concern that unless the EU and NATO take robust action they will be considered impotent and Putin will feel emboldened to try his strong arm tactics even on EU/NATO members, such as the Baltic states, sandwiched as they are between Russia proper and the Russian enclave of Kalingrad, tempting targets for Putin's neo-imperial aspirations.

 8) The Ukraine situation has the potential to have global ripples that effect a wider area than just Russia-Ukraine or FSU countries. If Putin can take over Ukraine, or even part of Ukraine and show up NATO and the West as impotent when it comes to defending a fellow European democracy then China and others will be emboldened as well. They have been playing similar "war games" over and near Taiwan and the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea recently, heightening concerns that Xi Jinping may attempt military action.

9) One benefit of Brexit it is that the British can make their own decisions again without getting permission from Germany and France, and they were among the first to send military aid (ie actual useful weapons) to Ukraine and have stationed British soldiers and tanks in Estonia, the NATO member likely most under threat, to make the point that the UK will stand by its allies. No mean feat considering how badly underfunded the British military is in recent decades.

10) Germany on the other hand is in a bind, dependent on Russia for nearly half of its gas supplies and with a big chunk of its economy tied to trade with Russia. Until the rise of China Germany was Russia's biggest non-FSU trading partner and Russia remains Germany's biggest trading partner. When the German govt wanted to join sanctions on Russia over the Crimea invasion in 2014 the head of Deutsche Bank and other German business leaders publicly demanded their govt recant as it would be too damaging for the German economy.

Germany has already had one covid recession, business leaders are already insisting sanctions on Russia would lead to another, and yet it seems that even Germany is coming around, to a large degree because Ukraine has stood its ground and is giving Russia a bloody nose. Had Ukraine simply crumpled before the Russian tanks it would more likely have been left to its fate. Obviously the situation is in flux, the outcome uncertain, but where Germany goes generally the rest of the EU follows.

How should Israel respond? 

Israel has close ties to both Ukraine and Russia, including personal connections with the leaders of both countries. 

1) Ukraine and Israel enjoy ever strengthening economic, cultural and security ties, their increasingly close relationship helping to grow Ukraine's economy with Israeli investment and job creation, thousands of Ukrainians now employed in Ukraine by Israeli companies. Historic connections between the two countries, the large numbers of Ukrainian olim and their descendents in Israel and the large numbers of Jews and Israelis living, studying and working in Ukraine also impact the relationship.  

2) The same though could also be said of Russia, closely linked to Israel through Israel's huge Russian speaking minority, Russia's Jewish community, mutual cultural heritage, as well as economic and security interests. Most pressing for Israel though is that the Russian military is ensconsed in bases in Syria right on Israel's northern border, possibly all that is holding Hizballah and Iranian forces in Syria in check. Without close cooperation from the Russians (for example Russia not providing the most advanced anti-aircraft systems to Syria) there is no way Israel could continue to protect its own security by destroying non-conventional and other weaponry in Syria and blocking at least some of the serious Iranian arms build up right on Israel's border. If Israel has any hope of reining in Iran's genocidal ambitions it likely rests on complex relations with Russia, not the West, certainly not solely on the West.

In the present crisis between Russia and Ukraine Israel must treat very softly and attempt to remain neutral as much as possible, for the survival and safety of Israel and with respect to the close ties it enjoys with both countries.