I get a lot of questions about Israel, people want simple one sentence answers, good, bad, black, white, in a nutshell.

It's been a diffcult few days in Israel. ISIS affiliated terrorists have attacked and killed 11 Israelis in the cities of Beer Sheva, Hadera and Bnei Brak, the largest number of Israelis killed by terrorists in a week since 2006.

Tonight as Israel grieves the victims of the third terror attack this week, I'm going to simply show you the complexity of Israel and the futility of trying to neatly put everyone in to categories.
Israel's current coalition government includes Ra''am, the Islamist party lead by Mansour Abbas. Abbas, a Muslim Israeli-Arab from the Galilee town of Mughar, is on record for expressing solidarity with the Jewish people for their suffering during the Holocaust and for condmening the attacks on synagogues and the Jewish community in mixed Arab-Jewish Israeli cities such as Lod and Akko last May.

The perpetrators of the attacks in Beer Sheva and Hadera were Arab citizens of Israel, one a Bedouin father of five from the Negev town of Hura, the others from the northern Arab Israeli town of Umm el Fahm.

The man in the photo below is Amir Khoury, the Arab-Israeli police officer who bravely tackled the Palestinian terrorist from Yabed who attacked passers by in Bnei Brak this evening. The terrorist was an Islamist, possibly affiliated in some way with ISIS.

The police officer who succeeded in stopping him was a Christian Arab from Nof Hagalil, a suburb of Nazareth. Sergeant Khoury, though already fatally wounded himself, successfully shot and killed the terrorist, but lost his life doing so. May his memory be blessed.

Shiny Happy Bagels

 

We sat down to a light dairy, fish and bagels Purim eve dinner tonight. Straightforward enough easy meal when everyone comes home starving after the public reading of the Book of Esther in synagogue following a day of fasting. Custom is not to break the fast until after hearing the public reading of the Book of Esther.

Among the many cute fancy dress costumes we saw tonight there was one very practical one - a kid dressed up like an old fashioned refreshments seller at a cinema or theatre, except instead of popcorn or chocolate she had individual little bottles of juice and pastries which she handed out to everyone as soon as the reading finished. Smart kid.

Back to our dinner at home though. DH set out the salads and I started cutting open bagels and, well, found this face in the first one that I cut.

Purim prank? Serendipity? Any way this could have been intentional rather than a fluke?

Could not have been any more appropriate timing than on this festival of topsyturvyness.

Rewarding Putin's aggression?

Watching the horrific war unleashed on Ukraine one can only pray that peace will be restored soon And yet following the reports of a potential ceasefire deal which may or may not be coming to fruition I can't help but be concerned where it leads and what it might mean for the long term stability and safety of Ukraine and its citizens.

Ukraine is desperate to end the suffering of its people and the destruction of its cities, but this deal offers Putin so much of what he wanted, it feels like giving him a huge reward for starting a war, a prize which down the road will only lead to more bloody Putin aggression against his neighbours. Maybe Ukraine has no choice right now, but what a capitulation to Putin's demands.

Bottom line, it sounds as though this is shaping up to be an imbalanced deal in which Ukraine is forced to make concrete territorial compromises, ceding territories to Russia such as Crimea, Donbass and probably more regions recently conquered by Russian forces, as well as giving up its aspirations to affiliate with Western organisations such as NATO and the EU, in exchange for which Ukraine receives airy "security guarantees" and vague promises from both Russia and NATO members like the US and UK guaranteeing its independence.

Ukraine already went this route in 1994 when the Clinton brokered Budapest Memorandum gave Ukraine guarantees from Russia, the US, and UK, with support from France and China, of its 'sovereignty and territorial integrity" in exchange for Ukraine relinquishing all of its nuclear arsenal to Russia. No, they didn't promise to militarily protect Ukraine's right to sovereignty, but they did pledge to intervene in its internal affairs or violate its sovereignty.

And look how well that worked out.

Talking to kids about current events

Many people have asked me how to explain to their children what is happening now in Ukraine. Many are frightened that nuclear war and MAD are imminent, others hear half-truths from friends in school about World War III, the end of civilsation, world famine and more impending disasters.  

Talk to your kids in an age appropriate way, teach them some of the history and background. I think it's also important to explain that in their grandparents' generation the world was brought close to a possible nuclear conflict, for example the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Yom Kippur War, this kind of brinkmanship has happened before surrounding other international conflicts and in the end nuclear war was avoided and the situation deescalated.

While nuclear war or some kind of WWIII is a remote possibility as a result of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, there are many other ways this could be resolved too, for example the ongoing negotiations being mediated by Israel between Russia and Ukraine. Nobody knows of course how this situation will end, but just because there is a worst case scenario doesn't mean there aren't also better ones. Many people are working behind the scenes to find a way for Putin to save face while ending the war and stepping back from the brink.

Explain to them honestly that a war between two major suppliers of the world's raw materials, from grain to fossil fuels, will have an impact on the world economy, cause food to become more expensive or lead to some shortages. I used this as an opportunity to chat with my older children about how markets work, supply and demand, inflation and necessity being the mother of invention. Don't overload with facts or lecture, try to engage with them about where our food comes from for example, what we produce locally, what we import. Try to put the current crisis in context, so that they can approach it in a matter of fact way rather than the hysteria they might be hearing from some media sources or peers.

My children were interested in hearing from elderly relatives who were children at the time of WWII and postwar rationing in Britain and Israel. Rather than frightening them they found it reassuring to know that children still had treats, that food might have been different but their grandparents and great uncles and aunts had good memories of their childhoods. Not that we are expecting rationing today, but it gave them a framework to understand that a long time ago there was upheaval, problems with supply of some foods and their grandparents and people adapted, got through it. 

Uncertainty is hard to deal with, but that is part of life and after the last couple of years we have become experts. People are resiliant, we as Israelis have dealt with many crises and come through them. It is OK to be scared and it is OK to feel stressed from all the uncertainty, it's important to talk and find a broader context and perspective from which to view current events.

There but for the grace of Iron Dome go we

I suppose it is the most natural thing in the world to look at a crisis somewhere else and translate it in to local terms, that is how we process information, through the prism of our own known and lived experience.

Every time I see the pictures of Ukrainian buildings and homes devastated by Russian rocket strikes my heart breaks for the Ukrainian people and my stomach clenches in the knowledge that there but for Iron Dome that would be us every time those same Grad type rockets are launched from Gaza in to Israel. There but for the grace of Iron Dome and Hashem go we.

Grads are not precision guided missiles, they are a fairly primitive but potentially very destructive weapon, most effective when unleashed in volleys to cover the general vicinity of a target, especially dense population centres, and so make up for their lack of precision.

If enough Grads are fired close together then likely at least one or two will score a direct hit on the actual target. So if say the Russian army wants to hit a local Ukrainian government or communications building, they will launch a salvo of rockets in its general direction, in the process hitting surrounding buildings, infrastructure, anything in that general area, be they civilian homes, schools, shops, hospitals, offices, anything at all. 

This is what makes Grads a terror weapon, their randomness and the way in which they are often deployed in this manner. There is no way to use Grad type rockets for "surgical strikes" or pinpoint targetting. Now translate that to a large city like Kharkiv or Kyiv.

Back in May 2021 when 4000 rockets were fired at Israeli population centres like Ashkelon and Ashdod, that's the damage and casualties we would have suffered without an Iron Dome defence system. We here are still under threat of rockets (and possible Russian capriciousness in Syria), we don't have Iron Dome batteries to spare, but isn't a solid missile defence system something NATO could provide? For anyone with qualms about providing offensive weapons, shouldn't providing a defense against rockets targetting population centres be a priority?

Russia and Ukraine

 

Short answer - it's complicated. Long answer as follows:

Why is Russia acting now?

1) Russia sees the rest of Europe as weak, unwilling or unable to do much more  (they may just be realising that they may have miscalculated on this, hence the nuclear Putin raising the nuclear threat). While the covid pandemic has had a major impact on Russia, it has been keen to play this down while by contrast the very public debates, protests, riots and chaos in many west European countries have been seen as signs of the unravelling of Western democracy, showing up the flaws of the democratic system and its lack of strong leadership in times of crisis. 

2) The UK is engaged in domestic navel gazing and the shenanigans of Boris Johnson, France is focused on elections, much of the Europe is in covid induced disarray, Belarus (with Russian support) has cynically shown how effective using immigrants is as a pressure tactic against the EU, but more than anything the European energy crisis means that Russia feels it has much of the continent beholden to the drug of Russian gas. Nearly half of the gas used in the EU comes from Russia. Germany is particularly dependent on it. Putin has used this to put pressure on the EU not to intervene.

It's interesting that the UK has sent some (very limited) military aid to Ukraine, defensive weapons such as anti-tank missiles. Britain gets most of its gas from the North Sea, either from British fields or Norway, with hardly any coming from Russia, perhaps giving Britain (which of course has also left the EU) more leeway to support Ukraine, though drastic defence cuts mean that the British military is hardly in a position to defend the British Isles from possible Russian threats (Russia has been making regular incursions in to northern British airspace and territorial waters for years now) much less send significant support to Ukraine. The UK has stationed soldiers and tanks in Estonia now to make the point that aggression against fellow NATO members will not be tolerated. 

3) Ukraine has actually become stronger in recent years, rebuilding its military with an eye on the increased Russian threat, and using the simmering "low intensity" conflict with Russian forces in the rebel provinces to better train its army to counter Russian forces. The Ukrainian economy too is not the basket case it once was. Israel and Ukraine have developed close economic ties and thousands of Ukrainians in Ukraine are employed by Israeli companies. As Putin is now finding out, invading and conquering Ukraine is not the cake walk he expected it to be. Putin is now calling in military back-up from his allies in Belarus. 

4) Global supply chains problems and soaring commodity prices have piqued Russia's interest in gaining control over Ukraine's rich resources, including coal, uranium, iron/steel and titanium. Ukraine has long been known as Europe's "bread basket", famed for its fertile soil and strong agricultural sector. It is a major producer of wheat, sunflowers (including sunflower oil production), potatoes, corn and honey. 

5) One can also speculate that the chaotic Allied withdrawal from Afghanistan may have emboldened Putin to make his move, especially when combined with the covid induced chaos, political polarisation and BLM protest movement. From Putin's perspective the US, like the European democracies, looks to be faltering, unsure of itself and too pre-occupied with domestic troubles to pay much attention to events in Ukraine and Russia. 

What is Russia's beef with Ukraine and how has it affected Russian policy vis a vis Ukraine?

1) Just as Erdogan in Turkey is trying to recreate the old Ottoman sphere of influence in an attempt to restore Turkish hegemony to the region, if not an actual empire, so it seems Putin is even more aggressively pursuing a similar policy, reverting to classic paradigms of imperial Russia. Putin has been quite clear about restoring Russian control of some sort over its traditional areas of influence in as much of its former empire as possible. 

2) There is a pattern here of Russian policy with many of its neighbours. It goes back to a defense doctrine of Tsarist Russia, adopted also by the Soviet Union and by Putin, a desire for large buffer territories between Russia and the western powers. Russia is concerned about its security and defense interests, worried that the westward expansion of NATO and the EU are a threat. Maintaining close ties with the regime in Belarus (some would say Belarus is a vassal state to Russia) is an important plank of this policy, as is keeping Ukraine closely tied to Russia. According to this Ukraine turning to the West, let alone actually talking of joining the EU or even NATO, a defense alliance which came in to being as a bulwark against Soviet Russia, cannot be tolerated as it directly threatens Russian security. 

3) Some within Russia see the whole matter as an internal affairs between Russo-Slavic states rather than one for international diplomacy. This is part of the problem with the West exerting pressure on Russia to desist and Ukraine apparently "betraying" Russia by seeking alliances elsewhere. 

4) Ukraine with its large Russian speaking population, as well as Kiyv, the symbol of the historic Kiyevan Rus, the cradle of eastern Slavic nationhood and civilisation, is a key component in Putin's ambition, an emotive rallying point for many Russian nationalists and pan-Slavic nationalists. The Kiyevan Rus is in some ways the east Slavic "Jerusalem", the keystone of the civilisation, the place where disparate Slavic and related tribes coalesced in to a nation, adopted Orthodox Christianity from Byzantine missionaries and created a golden age centred on Kiyv, who's modern golden domed historic churches date back to its heyday in the 9th-11th centuries.

Ukraine, Russia and Belarus all trace their national origins to this point and to the city which is today the Ukrainian capital. To some in Russia it is inconceivable that such a cultural icon should be in the hands of Ukraine and not Russia, especially a staunchly independent western oriented Ukraine rather than one tightly bound by a Russian leash. 

5) Ukraine has in the 21st century doggedly tried to reorientate itself vis a vis Russia. The Orange Revolution in 2004, the ousting of the scandal ridden and pro-Russian Leonid Kuchma marked a new assertion of Ukrainian independence not just in terms of sovereignty but also orientation, a shift towards Europe and the West rather than tightly bound to Russia as it had been until then. 

6) Russia has continued to arm and support Russian backed separatists in eastern Ukraine, perpetuating a bloody proxy conflict. This is similar to the tactic Russia used with Georgia, supporting South Ossetia and Abkhazia seperatists to weaken Georgia and break of chunks of another independent, sovereign neighbouring country, in order to bring them back under Russian control.

Likewise in Moldova, where since 1992 Russia has soldiers in Transnistria, a province it encouraged to breakaway from Moldova to try to preserve more territory under Russian control. Moldova still objects to this Russian military presence decades later, and even has a clause in its constitution professing Moldovan neutrality and prohibiting the stationing of foreign soldiers on Moldovan soil. Russia can hardly accuse Moldova of attempting to join NATO or threatening Russian interests, and yet Moldova fears that they are next on the list after Ukraine.  

5) Ukraine's boundaries have always been somewhat fluid and eastern regions have always had a heavily Russian influence, while prior to the Second World War there had been substantial Polish and German minorities in regions considered to be the Ukrainian cultural, patriotic and linguistic heartland in the west of the country in the Carpathian Mountains and cities such as Lviv, Ivano-Frankivisk and Tarnopil. 

Crimea for example had traditionally been a Tatar Khanate allied with the Ottoman Empire, then later part of the Russian Empire and part of Russia. It was Nikita Krushchev in 1954 who chose to transfer Crimea to the Soviet Republic of Ukraine. His motivations for doing so are not clear to this day, whether it was because as his daughter later claimed, the Russian Krushchev was nevertheless very fond of Ukraine, his "favourite republic" or because he was concerned to ensure the Slavic identity of this strategic peninsular, who's Muslim Tartar population had largely either fled during the Russian-Turkish conflicts of the 19th century or been forcibly exiled to eastern Russia in 1944 or because gifting Crimea to Ukraine was seen as a way of more tightly binding Ukraine to Russia. Whatever the reason Putin considers it legitimate to transfer Crimea back to Russian control by force. 

Why should the Western powers care? 

1) In the 1990s, following Ukraine's declaration of independence the new Ukrainian state was in a position to become one of the world's strongest nuclear powers with the third biggest arsenal in the world. However it signed the NPT and under the conditions of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum agreed to relinquish its nuclear weapons (handing them over to Russia) in exchange for security guarantees from the US, UK and Russia. China and France pledged to respect and protect Ukraine's sovereignty and  territorial integrity. 

2) Russia's actions over the last decade are in clear breach of the Budapest Memorandum and the guarantees to protect Ukraine from any and all acts of aggression following its fulfillment of the agreement to dispose of its nuclear arsenal. Under the conditions of the agreement the US, UK must protect Ukraine from acts of aggression, as guarantors of the Budapest Memorandum the US and UK should have prevented the Russian invasion. Their failure to do so breaches their treaty obligations.

3) Russia remains in possession of a huge nuclear arsenal. With Russia becoming increasingly belligerent over the last year, members of the Ukrainian government, as well as President Zelensky are on record as saying they are seriously considering rebuilding Ukraine's nuclear capabilities in response to the Russian threat. As far as I know Ukraine has not acted on this proposal, but clearly the US and European powers are concerned about the possibility of a new nuclear arms race in Europe and the FSU states. 

4)  Russia's actions and the potential for sparking more instability and conflagrations around Russia's European borders are of great concern to many Western countries and the US. Putin in the last few years has greatly stepped up his meddling in neighbouring countries with what seems to be a view to gradually restoring the Russian empire, consider his support for pro-Russian separatists in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, going so far as to invade and go to war with Georgia in 2008. Likewise Russia's recognition and support of the breakaway Donetsk and Luhansk provinces in eastern Ukraine, as well as Russian military intervention in Negorno-Karabakh (and selling weapons to both Armenia and Azerbaijan) and more recently in Kazakhstan (propping up the current regime), plus Russia's close ties and current military "exercise" with Belarus, Europe's last dictatorship, which (some allege under Russian direction) has been attempting to pressure and destabilise the EU by creating a Middle Eastern migrant crisis on its border. 

5) The small Baltic states are watching especially closely, fearful that Russia will use a similar excuse to that used for its intervention in eastern Ukraine "protecting persecuted Russian minorities" to try to reassert Russian influence and even direct rule in Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia. They however have a defence that Ukraine lacks: membership of the EU and NATO, which they hope will guarantee their security. They are concerned though that if the EU and NATO do not put up a robust response to Russia's assault on democratic Ukraine then the NATO/EU deterrence factor may wane enough that Putin will emerge emboldened from his Ukraine adventure to pursue his territorial ambitions in the Baltics.

6) Attacking an EU or NATO member would be a huge leap from going after Ukraine, but Putin is constantly pushing the boundaries and the more he sees NATO and the EU just talking the talk but not really doing much the more he will be emboldened to push further. For years now Russia has been pushing in to NATO territory, their military aircraft routinely making incursions in to NATO air space as far west as Scotland, their submarines and warships likewise literally testing the waters, testing NATO responses, stretching the limits of what NATO countries will tolerate, accept as routine and turn a blind eye to.

The defense establishments in many European countries have been worrying what this might be a prelude to, a gradual erosion of deterrence, an attempt to lull NATO defences in to accepting these incursions as routine so they don't pick up on something more dangerous. 

7) Ukraine was seen as easy pickings by Putin because it isn't EU or NATO. So maybe he'll bite off this chunk of the former Russian empire and be satisfied, Kiyv has a lot more emotional pull for Russian nationalists than many other regions of the old empire, that's certainly true. Other non-NATO/non-EU states though are looking on anxiously. Top of the list, Moldova is certainly concerned that if Ukraine falls to Russia they may be next. Georgia has already been by Russia in the last few years, they too fear that Russia will make another attempt emboldened by NATO weakness. 

There is grave concern that unless the EU and NATO take robust action they will be considered impotent and Putin will feel emboldened to try his strong arm tactics even on EU/NATO members, such as the Baltic states, sandwiched as they are between Russia proper and the Russian enclave of Kalingrad, tempting targets for Putin's neo-imperial aspirations.

 8) The Ukraine situation has the potential to have global ripples that effect a wider area than just Russia-Ukraine or FSU countries. If Putin can take over Ukraine, or even part of Ukraine and show up NATO and the West as impotent when it comes to defending a fellow European democracy then China and others will be emboldened as well. They have been playing similar "war games" over and near Taiwan and the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea recently, heightening concerns that Xi Jinping may attempt military action.

9) One benefit of Brexit it is that the British can make their own decisions again without getting permission from Germany and France, and they were among the first to send military aid (ie actual useful weapons) to Ukraine and have stationed British soldiers and tanks in Estonia, the NATO member likely most under threat, to make the point that the UK will stand by its allies. No mean feat considering how badly underfunded the British military is in recent decades.

10) Germany on the other hand is in a bind, dependent on Russia for nearly half of its gas supplies and with a big chunk of its economy tied to trade with Russia. Until the rise of China Germany was Russia's biggest non-FSU trading partner and Russia remains Germany's biggest trading partner. When the German govt wanted to join sanctions on Russia over the Crimea invasion in 2014 the head of Deutsche Bank and other German business leaders publicly demanded their govt recant as it would be too damaging for the German economy.

Germany has already had one covid recession, business leaders are already insisting sanctions on Russia would lead to another, and yet it seems that even Germany is coming around, to a large degree because Ukraine has stood its ground and is giving Russia a bloody nose. Had Ukraine simply crumpled before the Russian tanks it would more likely have been left to its fate. Obviously the situation is in flux, the outcome uncertain, but where Germany goes generally the rest of the EU follows.

How should Israel respond? 

Israel has close ties to both Ukraine and Russia, including personal connections with the leaders of both countries. 

1) Ukraine and Israel enjoy ever strengthening economic, cultural and security ties, their increasingly close relationship helping to grow Ukraine's economy with Israeli investment and job creation, thousands of Ukrainians now employed in Ukraine by Israeli companies. Historic connections between the two countries, the large numbers of Ukrainian olim and their descendents in Israel and the large numbers of Jews and Israelis living, studying and working in Ukraine also impact the relationship.  

2) The same though could also be said of Russia, closely linked to Israel through Israel's huge Russian speaking minority, Russia's Jewish community, mutual cultural heritage, as well as economic and security interests. Most pressing for Israel though is that the Russian military is ensconsed in bases in Syria right on Israel's northern border, possibly all that is holding Hizballah and Iranian forces in Syria in check. Without close cooperation from the Russians (for example Russia not providing the most advanced anti-aircraft systems to Syria) there is no way Israel could continue to protect its own security by destroying non-conventional and other weaponry in Syria and blocking at least some of the serious Iranian arms build up right on Israel's border. If Israel has any hope of reining in Iran's genocidal ambitions it likely rests on complex relations with Russia, not the West, certainly not solely on the West.

In the present crisis between Russia and Ukraine Israel must treat very softly and attempt to remain neutral as much as possible, for the survival and safety of Israel and with respect to the close ties it enjoys with both countries.